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Abstract 
 
The author studies three aspects of human live valuation and its relation with cost benefit 
analysis and regulation. More precisely the author addresses the problem of valuation of a 
statistical human life and its relation with cost benefit analysis in mortality risk reduction. 
First, studies the debate about Valuation of a Statistical Human Life (VSL) and Cost-
Benefit Analysis (CBA) in mortality risks regulation; second, deals with two challenges 
to CBA and VSL, these are (a) the problem of discount rates and the problem of 
(dis)counting of future human lives, and (b), tests if culture (represented as a set of 
values) has an incidence in risk preferences and therefore, in willingness to pay for life in 
different countries.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Are human lives priceless? Never! If human lives were allowed to concur without 
restrictions to the market mechanism as goods, some price they would have2. Claims for 
priceless or the impossibility of determination an exchange value for human lives is only 
                                                
2 In fact, even if it is crude, rude or rough, human trafficking is just a market reaction to such prohibition. 
Such black markets set certain prices for humans, above the possible equilibrium, due to the prohibition.  
justifiable with regard to the language and reasoning of ethics3. In economics, and in the 
law, the valuation of a human life is an answer and necessary medium in the analysis and 
mitigation of risk, harm, and fear4.   
 
In this article I will study three aspects of human live valuation and its relation with and 
cost benefit analysis in regulation. More precisely I will address the problem of valuation 
of a statistical human life and its relation with cost benefit analysis in mortality risk 
reduction. First I will study the debate about Valuation of a Statistical Human Life (VSL) 
and Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) in mortality risks regulation; second, I will address two 
challenges to CBA and VSL, these are the problem of discount rates and the problem of 
(dis)counting of future human lives, and second, I will try to test if culture (represented as 
a set of values) has an incidence in risk preferences and therefore, in willingness to pay 
for life in different countries.  
 
2. Valuation of a Statistical Life and CBA 
 
The social value of a life comes from the value that others put to an individuals life. But, 
statistical methods are less condemnable since they place the determination of life in the 
actual behavioral actions of people5. Individuals make decisions everyday that reflect 
how they value health and mortality risks6 For example, the construction of a highway is 
                                                
3 Michael D. Bayles, The price of life, 89, Ethics, 20, 20-21 (October, 1978). 
4 Cfr. Cass Sunstein. Incommensurability and valuation in law. 92 Mich. L. Rev. 779-861 (1994). 
5 Cass Sunstein et. al. A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, Behavioral Law and Economics 13, 
14-16 (2002)  
6 W. Kip Viscusi. The value of a statistical life: a critical review of market estimates throughout the world. 
27 J. Risk and Uncertainty, 5 (1, 2003).   
costly in terms of human lives. Workers know or have a perception of the probable risks 
and voluntarily assume the risk at a certain wage. On the other hand people know or 
subjectively assume that buying certain products is riskier or less risky that other 
products at a certain price difference7. For example, in the case of product safety, the 
consumption of risky product is an indicator of the consumer behavior and his 
determination of the statistical value of his life. Then, using evidence on market choices 
that involve implicit tradeoffs between risks and money; economists have developed 
estimates of the vale of a statistical life.  
 
The rationale of the techniques of valuation of a life is based in the determination of the 
regulation efficiency in terms of cost-benefit. Cost-Benefit analysis has been in the 
literature since long time ago. Departing from the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria to the 
sharper Scitovsky definition, such mechanism has been used in economics as a standard 
in policy and economics decision. In fact, several sustained that public policy was only 
justified if it produced social gains in excess of social losses so that it was possible for 
winners from the policy to compensate losers8. The maximization, then, is a procedure 
of expected lives saved; this is the number of lives saved due to the probability of 
reduction risk9. In fact, the adoption of regulation not necessarily implies a risk reduction, 
but a chance of risk reduction. So, if a policy is determined to save 50 lives in a period of 
10 years, with a 80% chance, this means that the expected number of lives saved is 40, 
                                                
7 Bayles, Supra, note 3.  
8 John Persky, Retrospectives: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Classical Creed. 15 J. Econ. Perspectives. 
199, 201 (Autumn, 2001).   
9 Charles Fried. The value of life. 82  Harv. L. Rev. 1415, 1420 (1969).  
and therefore the statistical value of lives must not be the net number but the expected 
number.   
 
Therefore, if the problem of regulation is to reduce risks and increase safety, the goal of 
such policies should be measured by the number of lives saved. Life then has a value 
relative to other ends and therefore, there is a tradeoff between life and legal policy ends. 
Indeed, the question, how much a life values, is only raised to determine if certain policy 
will be cost efficient or not. Regulators cannot tell how much is the government investing 
in saving a life by simple dividing their budget for the expected number of lives saved. 
They must, previously, determine if it is worth to spend certain amount of money in the 
reduction of three, six or one hundred lives. Therefore, reduction of mortality risks, as a 
government policy, must comply with certain criteria which lead to a reasonable 
decision10. Several criteria had been proposed to determine the reasonability of such 
policy measures. Rationality requires that the allocation of resources be done in order to 
attain the highest possible wealth fare at the lowest possible effort11. As the risk-risk 
analysis is, the benefit-cost analysis seems to be the most important mechanism to attain 
such reasonability in policy decision making12.  
 
In conclusion, in death risks lives saved are simply benefits. The problem, in the side of 
the costs is not hard to hurdle since the costs of such programs are usually easy to 
monetize if they all are not monetary. The problem becomes harder when it is necessary 
                                                
10 W. Kip Viscusi, Mortality Effects of Regulatory Costs and Policy Evaluation Criteria, 25, RAND J. 
Econ. 94, 94-95 (spring, 1994).  
11 Fried, Supra note 11 at 1416. 
12 OMB Circular A-4, September 17, (2003).  
to monetize lives in average. This means, not particular lives of particular people with 
particular incomes and income trends, but to determine a value for a human life in 
statistical terms, in a way that allows commensurability.  
 
Usually the literature focuses in the willingness to pay approach derived from labor 
markets. The literature had focus primarily in the estimation of the on-the-job risk 
exposure, risk-money tradeoffs, and price-risk (price-safety) tradeoffs13. The estimation 
from labor markets the most developed of the latter. The economist using this 
methodology use hedonic wage or price models that, controlled by productivity and 
quality components of the job, determine the price or wages associated with the different 
choices of risk14. The advantage of labor markets is the availability of data and different 
levels of risks which allow research to observe the equilibriums of risk choices but 
several econometric techniques have been developed. The first and general approach15 is 
based in the relation between fatality of risk and wiliness to pay. For example, if a worker 
faces a risk of 4/100,000 of death, and is willing to pay $50 to reduce such risk to 
3/100,000 the workers is valuating his life in 5 million (50*100,000) since the value of an 
statistical life is  
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13 Viscusi, Supra note 6, at 6. 
14 Id. at 7. 
15 Joni Hersch. Materials for the course in Empirical Methods for Legal Analysis. 207 (Fall -2005).  
Where Y∂ is the variation in the income, and Risk∂ is the variation of risk.  
 
A more stylized approach is the developed by Viscusi and others, in which through labor 
market data on observed wages and actual workers behavior, not surveyed changes in 
income, and job risks, it is possible determine the value of an statistical life with 
econometric or multivariate analysis16. The estimation is simple, the function to run is: 
 
εθλβα +++++= ...GenderEducationRiskY  
 
Where Y is the income, Risk is the number of fatalities over the number of cases and, 
Education and Gender are other variables that affect and control the estimation of the 
coefficients. The point here is the identification of B since such coefficient defines the 
value of a statistical life17. 
 
According to Viscusi18, the proper way to value the risk reduction benefits derived from 
governments policy is a method that leads to determine the societys willingness to 
pay for the benefits of risk reduction. Given this method, the approach is based in 
searching the amount a society is willing to pay as general basis for the calculation of the 
benefits19. These calculations of willingness to pay are usually conduced by determining 
how much people do pay in actual market settings to reduce certain risk of harm20. So, 
under the willingness to pay approach the value of a statistical life is, assuming 
                                                
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 Viscusi, Supra note 5, at 6. 
19 Cass Sunstein. Cost Benefit default principles. 99 Mich. Law Rev. 1651, 1706 (2001).  
20 Id.  
rationality, the social mean marginal rate of substitution of own wealth for safety21. That 
is why, mainstream economic analysis use willingness to pay as the mean of valuation 
since it is the only way to mimic the market valuations22. In the case of mortality risk 
reduction, for example, the benefit is the value of the reduced probability of death that is 
experienced by the affected population, not the value of the lives that has been saved ex 
post23. Such willingness to pay is combined with the amount of risk that constitutes the 
problem analyzed; this is, for example, 6,800 people death until 2010 due to Bronchitis. 
This implies that the benefits of such program, if it is capable of reducing the number 
cited, is the simple multiplication between the risk and the willingness to pay for a 
reduction in the risk of contracting chronic bronchitis24.  
 
It is possible to challenge this approach in several ways: First, the willingness to pay 
could be no properly calculated, therefore, it is not a real willingness to pay but a 
presumed actual transaction for a fraction of life. Second, even if willingness to pay 
was properly calculated probably it is not the best way to monetize the costs in terms of 
human lives. Third, probably there was an overstatement of the number of lives saved, or 
the number of cases. Fourth, probably the agency overvalued or unevaluated the number 
of lives saved. And fifth, perhaps the agency overvalued or under valued the 
monetization of lives saved25.  
 
                                                
21 M.W. Jones-Lee, Paternalistic Altruism and the Value of Statistical Life  102 The Economic Journal 80, 
(1992) 
22 Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis. 29 J. Legal. Stud. 931, 945 (2000).  
23 Viscusi, Supra note 6, at 6. 
24 Id. Citing: Innovative strategies group. Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analysis, 
Ozone and Particulates (1998). 
25 Cass Sunstein. Cost Benefit default principles. 99 Mich. Law Rev. 1651, 1708 (2001).  
It is pretty enlightening the approach followed by Freeman26 when he states that  
 
the economic question being dealt with here is not about how much an 
individual would be willing to pay to avoid his or her certain death or how much 
compensation that individual would require to accept that death. In this respect, 
the term "value of life" is an unfortunate phrase that does not reflect the true 
nature of the question at hand. Most people would be willing to pay their total 
wealth to avoid certain death; and there is probably no finite sum of money that 
could compensate an individual for the sure loss of life. Rather, the economic 
question is about how much the individual would be willing to pay to achieve a 
small reduction in the probability of death during a given period or how much 
compensation that individual would require to accept a small increase in that 
probability. 
 
This statement clarifies the end and aim of life valuation for regulatory purposes. The 
idea is not to ask how much people or societies are willing to pay for their lives, but how 
much do they value the governmental efforts to reduce risks. Therefore, such valuations 
are likely to be different a cross different individuals, different cities, regions and 
countries. The reasons are simple: first, the attitudes of people to risk are different in 
terms of risk aversion27 and in terms of cultural preferences for risks, and second, as 
                                                
26 Freeman III, A. M. The measurement of environmental and resource values. Resources for the Future, 
320 (1993). 
27 David Pearce. Valuing Statistical Lives. 18 Planejamento e Politicas Publicas. 69, 78 (Brazil, December, 
1998). 
safety is a normal good, those with higher income have a higher willingness to pay28. The 
same behavior is present in a willingness to accept approach, where people face the 
possibility of accepting premium wages or diminutions in rent or other payments in 
exchange of a higher risk29. But the willingness to accept presents a cognitive problem; it 
gives to individuals the perception of a property right over the decision of getting in a 
risky situation, therefore, the willingness to accept models tend to develop higher 
valuations.  
 
On the other hand, cost-benefit analysis involving human lives has several positive points 
which make it the most feasible in front of many other mechanisms of policy analysis 
since it informs the public and the government about a regulators criteria to make 
decisions30. Definitely, cost-benefit is useful for comparing the favorable and unfavorable 
effects of policies, it permits the comparison between different sets of policies, gives self 
explanations with reliable evidence about the convenience of certain policy, and provides 
space to challenge regulatory policy. In addition, determines a unitary monetization of 
benefits which are usually lower risks, permit external analysis of such monetization and 
the economic assumptions involved in them, and the distributional consequences of 
policy31.  
 
                                                
28 Id. Also see: Viscusi, Supra, note 6; Viscusi, Supra, note 10; Fried, Supra, note 11. 
29 Pearce, Supra, note 27 at 79. 
30 To see some objections to the traditional Cost-Benefit analysis: Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis 
of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 387 (1981). Also see: Amartya Sen, The Discipline of 
Cost-Benefit Analysis. 29 J. Legal. Stud. 931 (2000). 
31 Kenneth Arrow, et. al. Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health and Safety 
Regulation? 272 Science, 221, 221-23 (April, 12 1996)  
By the same token, in several studies the statistical valuation of a life has been challenged 
in several ways. The most important challenge comes from the actual preferences of 
regulation that people has. Some studies reveal that in choosing among different risk of 
life programs, people care both about the qualitative characteristics of the regulation as 
the numbers of lives saved32. In fact, many answers were inelastic with respect to the 
numbers of lives saved.  
 
In the survey conducted by Subramanian and Cropper, programs in which the target of 
regulation was air and/or water pollution, respondents chose these programs regardless of 
the number of lives saved33. On the same grounds, people were less sensitive to the 
number of lives saved for environmental programs than the number of lives saved in 
public health programs. Costs, or assumptions about the probable costs of a program, also 
affected the election between programs, giving a stronger incentive to select programs 
were the expected costs were lower than in the program compared with34.   
 
However, maybe the problem with the lives saved approach is the troublesome cognitive 
effect that a question for the relation between lives and money generates. But also, people 
tend to weight or being less skeptical of the idea that programs should be balanced 
according to the numbers of lives saved by each program. Therefore, some of these 
findings could be questionable because of cognitive problems, and some others seem to 
be accurate in the same grounds. In addition, empirical evidence has shown that taken 
                                                
32 Uma Subramanian & Maureen Cropper. Public Choices Between Life Saving Programs: The Tradeoff 
Between Qualitative Factors and Lives Saved, 21 J Risk and Uncertainty, 117, 119 (2000). 
33 Subramanian & Cropper, Supra, note 32.  
34 Id. at 133.  
people to ask questions in isolation their answers are completely different than the 
answers given to contextualized or comparative categories35.  
 
Furthermore, contingent valuation and willingness to pay are a hard case for research. As 
it posts the case of hypothetical questions about how much are X, Y or Z groups of 
people willing to pay for a, b or c object. The problem is that usually such mocked 
decision analysis, goes against the rational choice model, making, for example, equally 
valuable prevent 2,000 migratory birds being killed than 20,000 or 200,00036.  In the 
same grounds, it has been proven that people tends to think that certain risky events are 
more likely to occur than certain other events, just because there is a memory of its 
occurrence.  So, people overestimate highly publicized events but under estimate less 
publicized events37. Regrettably, people are irrational and their preferences and 
precautions are developed or maintained by the panic, hysteria and baseless fear of 
risks that, related to other kinds of risks, are meaningless38. Moreover, vivid mental 
pictures of widespread death can drive a demand for risk regulation39 with out being 
such demand the most rational o efficient kind of regulation.  
 
                                                
35 Cass Sunstein, Cognition and cost benefit analysis. 29 J. Legal Stud. 1059, 1071 (2000).  
36 Amartya Sen, Environmental Evaluation and Social Choice: Contingent Valuation and the Market 
Analogy. 46 Japanese Econ. Rev. 23 (1995). Sen, Supra, note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 946-47. 
37 Cfr. Cass Sunstein,. Laws of fear: beyond the precautionary principle. (2005). 
38 Id. at --. For example, the question right now would be, what is more risky, to eat meat or eat chicken. 
Will be more risky in the near future to eat pork? Probably, it isnt yet publicized by the news but the mad 
pork disease is attacking china, there are 36 cases and 198 with out confirmation. The point is, the first two 
were events highly publicized by the news, however, their impact on health was minimum compared with 
some other industrial risks. See:  Cass Sunstein, Cognition and cost benefit analysis. 29 J. Legal Stud. 1059, 
1067 (2000). 
39 Sunstein, Supra, note 37. 
Even mainstream economists accept that cost-benefit analysis for programs on mortality 
and health risks are not always definitive. Even regulation with a positive benefit-cost 
balance can incur in wrongful effects. For example, Viscusi discussed the effect of risk 
reduction and its causality and tradeoff with risk increasing. This is, studied the relation 
between the regulation of risk and expansion of another risk due to the substitution effect. 
His findings, in such cases, indicated that high cost regulations are usually 
counterproductive since they determine a higher risk substitution effect40. For example, 
the regulatory effects on the level of safety are usually intended to decrease risk, but 
those high levels of safety compensate the wage differentials, which indicate risky jobs, 
and incentive people to decrease their own mechanisms to reduce risk by health 
investments41. Indeed seems pretty logical that, before a third party effort is effective in 
the reduction of a risk, such effort could lead individuals to reduce their sacrifices to 
reduce risks.  
 
Correlated is the systemic effect of regulation, which is not usually taken into account. A 
decision to regulate nuclear power could increase the demand for coal-fired power plants 
which have immediate environmental harm effects and not a potential/probable 
catastrophic effect as nuclear plants have42.  Examples as the last one show that there are 
health-health or risk-risk tradeoffs made by the regulator most of the time with out 
balancing the effect on the potential number of lives lost or saved.  
 
                                                
40 Viscusi, Supra, note 10. 
41 Viscusi, Supra, note 10 at 100.  
42 Cass Sunstein, Cognition and cost benefit analysis. 29 J. Legal Stud. 1059, 1069 (2000). 
Sunstein has been more conscious about the subject, and, avoiding mainstream economic 
analysis supports the necessity and convenience of cost-benefit analysis on the grounds of 
behavioral economics and cognitive psychology43.  Among his findings, he suggests that 
cost-benefit analysis is the best mean to defend and overcome problems related with 
individual and social cognition. In addition, cost-benefit analysis should be understood 
as a method for putting on screen important social facts that might otherwise escape 
private and public attention44. Therefore, cost benefit analysis ensures the attendance of 
priority setting and permits the production of burdens and hurdles of desirable 
regulation45.  
 
This, view is clearly challenging since, despite of the claims of the author, the point of 
cost benefit analysis is not the maximization of the best possible risk regulation, but the 
maximization of societal interest. Indeed, not every regulation could be understood on 
grounds of economic efficiency, however, cost benefit analysis, in Sunsteins way, 
provides to regulators an agnostic tool to attract the support of several groups of people 
with diverse and competing views. This is only attainable if cost benefit analysis is seen 
as a way to overcome predictable problems and recognize the risks to life and health at 
both the individual and the social levels46.  
 
His proposition of a non rival rationality is quite interesting, since trying to avoid rivalry 
in demand of regulation, he encounters a way to depart from the lives saved criterion, 
                                                
43 Cfr. Id.  
44 Id. at 1060-63. 
45 Id.  
46 Id., at 945. 
for reasons that cast a clearer light on what it is that they are attempting to maximize. 
In synthesis he finds that people are willing to pay a premium to avoid deaths that 
involve a high degree of pain and suffering, second, people are willing to devote more 
resources to protect children, third people are willing to pay a premium to aver 
catastrophes, fourth, people are willing to devote more resources to protect against 
dangers when the costs of risk avoidance are high, and finally, people may believe that 
it is especially important to protect vulnerable or traditionally disadvantaged groups 
against certain risks47.  
 
In conclusion, Sunstein sets seven propositions to complete the theories of cost benefit 
analysis. First, identify and qualify the advantages and disadvantages of courses of action; 
second, provide quantitative and qualitative descriptions determining who gets or bears 
the benefits and costs of regulation, in a way to define who is helped and who is hurt; 
third, commensurate values to monetary values; fourth, establish and adjust floors and 
limits to regulation expending, by statutory measures. For example minimum and 
maximum cost for life-saved; fifth, adjust according to qualitative factors, the floors and 
ceilings of regulation. Sixth, respond to social fear, this means, not regulating or over 
regulating but trough education and reassurance. Seventh, determine a procedure for 
judicial review of risk regulation, in order to determine, judicially, if certain regulation 
has created more good than harm48.  
 
3. Theoretical Challenges to CBA, VSL and Regulation 
                                                
47 See: Sunstein, Supra, note 35Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1089-91. 
48 Sunstein, Supra, note 35, at 1095.  
 Even thought the aforementioned challenges and contents of the Cost-Benefit Analysis 
debate are enough to show the benefits and costs of statistical valuation of lives, 
there are two points that I want to comment in detail and suggest further analysis. Those 
are, the problem of discount rates in the determination of the benefits of regulation 
involving valuation of future human lives, and the incidence of culture in the valuation of 
human lives. 
 
3.1 (Dis)counting the Value of Future Lives 
 
In the first part of this paper I discussed the problem of determining benefit in the CB 
analysis. But willingness to pay and risk estimations are not all the variables used in 
determining the benefits of a policy. Now, I want to address the problem of discount 
rates. These rates are used in finances to define the present value of investment. 
Regulation is investment, and in our case the return is lower risks of death. The discount 
rate is also an important variable in the determination of benefits since it is the limit of 
valuation of future life. However, the logic of discount rates generates an 
intergenerational and ethical problem, since them affect and determine the value of future 
lives. This means, that the discount rate defines how much the government values a life 
in the future in terms of lives now. Thus, the question is, are discount rates a 
fair/neutral variable in the determination of the benefits of risk reduction programs? 
 
Let me start from the beginning. The logic and foundations of the discount rate are highly 
questionable. The aim of such rate is to discount the value lost by a dollar today, since it 
values more than tomorrow. The problems are that there is an opportunity cost and a 
problem of time preferences. The challenges of opportunity cost are simple: if a 
government agency can invest 1 dollar in a project today it has an opportunity cost of 
investment in a different project. On the other hand, it is a principle of rationality49 that 
people prefers a benefit today than in the future, therefore the expected future earnings 
must be discounted due to such loses50.  
 
Is the future, then, less valuable than the present? A positive answer has not a problem in 
pure rational grounds, but, if we approach to the future in a different perspective as an 
equality approach, such statement could affect the monetization of benefits. What is 
exactly the point? That if a life is valued today at $4.8 million -as the EPA stated in the 
National Ambient Air Quality and Particulate Standards-, at a 10% discount rate, such 
life in 100 years is going to value $348.31. Even worst, in 10 years such life is worth 
$1,850,608, which is a 38% of the value; this means that future lives are geometrically 
depreciated.  
 
What happens with different discount rates? The Table 1 shows the problem with these 
rates. As we can see a discount rate of 10% determines a completely different value of a 
life in the future. This means, that such life has a different value in the future determined 
                                                
49 Andrea Mas Collel, et. al. Microeconomic Theory, Chapter 1, Preference and Choice, 7 (2001) 
50 Sunstein, Supra note 19, at 1712. A simple function is nt
r
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by a different discount rate. The theory is understandable, and in certain way is 
justifiable, the benefits of a program are not inflated by no discounting, but, on the other 
hand, the benefits of a program can be arbitrarily overestimated by the determination of a 
low discount rate. If we look at the table we can see that in the year 2020 a life cost 
$1,783,334 discounted at 2%. On the other hand, discounted at 5% the same life has a 
Statistical Value of $418,578. Furthermore, at a 10% discount rate, such life only costs in 
20 years, $40,889.  
 
Table 1. VSL in Years. 
 
 
The differences are huge and can totally affect the outcome of a cost benefit analysis. 
Think in a program that claims to safe 13 lives each year. In the year 20 the SVL of the 
lives saved is $42 millions at a 2% discount rate, $23 million at a 5% discount rate, and 9 
million at a 10% rate. This means that the election of a discount rate makes an enormous 
difference in the long run evaluation of the benefits of a risk of death reduction program.  
 
It is true that according with the OMB Circular A-4 the default discount rate is 7%51. This 
eliminate certain disparities between agencies and programs valuation of future lives 
since equalizes the rate as a default. The election of such rate was not arbitrary since it is 
the estimate of the average-before tax rate of return to private capital in the U.S. 
Economy52, but, according to the same Circular, it is probably not the best way to 
determine a discount rate. In fact, the Circular mentioned makes an explicit reference to 
the circular A-94 in terms of discounting, but such circular makes the same assumptions 
and does not contribute to the problem we have been discussing53. In addition, the 
Memorandum no. M-05-07, released on January 31, 2005, the Director of the OMB 
stated that The rates presented in Appendix C do not apply to regulatory analysis or 
benefit-cost analysis of public investment. Then, they are to be used for lease-purchase 
and cost-effectiveness analysis, as specified in the Circular. So, the only possible 
mandatory application of discount rates was overruled.  
 
The OBM, showing concern about the ethical issues states that some [authors] believe, 
however, that it is ethically impermissible to discount the utility of future generations. 
That is, government should treat all generations equally. Even under this approach it 
would still be correct to discount future costs and consumption benefits generally due 
to the expectation that future generations will be wealthier and thus will value a marginal 
dollar benefit and costs by less than those alive today54.  
                                                
51 OMB Circular A-94. Revesz, in Environmental Regulation, Cost-benefit Analysis and the Discounting of 
Human Lives. 99 Colum. L. Rev. 941 (1999), questions the 7% rate abovementioned, because it seems to 
be too high. 
52 OMB Circular A-4, 33, (September 17, 2003).  
53 OMB Circular A-94  
54 OMB Circular A-4, 36, (September 17, 2003).  
 This statement assumes that the future will always be better for future generations in 
terms of dollar value. Unfortunately this could only be true in the long, long run, not in 
the medium or short run. Not necessarily, in five or ten years, the marginal value of a 
dollar is going to be lower, in fact, macroeconomic evidence suggests that every x years, 
depending on the structure of the market and the behavior of the fundamentals, 
depression would be followed by growth and growth by depression (see Graph 1). Taking 
this panorama, clearly discounting not necessarily means an equal treatment of all 
generations.  
 
 
 
     Graph 1. World Economic Cycle. 
 
Several authors have argued about the logic and the problems of discounting in regulation 
of health and lives. Sunstein, seemed to be worried about the statutory regulation that 
controls the decisions about discounting of the regulatory agencies55. He shows the 
preoccupation I am trying to highlight here. Some times, the same agency, without any 
justification but its own discretion, determines the discount rate for the value of a 
statistical life or the value of health at different rates, some times 3% sometimes 7% or 
some time 10%, for different programs. Indeed, if the goal of  safety programs were 
to maximize the number of lives saved, one would expect the cost of saving a life, at the 
margin, to be equalized among programs. Studies, however, reveal large disparities56. 
 
This is not only an erratic practice that indicates a lack of certainty and standardized 
procedures involved in the analysis but also shows a power that could be handled as a 
good in a market for regulation. Thus, if the regulator can arbitrarily determine a 
discount rate, and taking into account that such rate can change the result of the CBA, 
then, there is an incentive to take the regulator57. 
 
Sunstein suggest another point, perhaps guided by Revesz writings58. He sustains that if 
a regulation will save ten lives this year and ten lives annually for the next ten years, it 
cannot be plausibly be urged that the future savings are worth less than the current 
savings on the ground that a current life saved can be immediately invested.59 In fact, 
even if you could argue that agents would rationally prefer to save ten lives today than 
ten lives in ten years, such statement is simply unsustainable in moral grounds. In reality, 
                                                
55 Sunstein, Supra, note 19, at 1711-15. 
56 Subramanian and Cropper, Supra note 32. 
57 This means, to pursue the regulator to over or underestimate the discount rate and in that way be able to 
find a negative or a positive test of CBA.  
58 Cfr. Richard Revesz. Environmental Regulation, Cost-benefit Analysis and the Discounting of Human 
Lives. 99 Colum. L. Rev. 941 (1999). 
59 Sunstein, Supra, Note 19, at 1712.  
you could only sustain the opposite: it is better to save ten lives in the future than ten 
lives today since it is cheaper. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned, Revesz suggests that there are two problems under the 
name of discounting: the latent harms, this is the possible exposures to harms that an 
individual could experience in the future, and the harms to future generations. It is 
reasonably to say that latent harms should count for less than immediate ones. So, the 
regulator is stating that prefers harms in the future than harms in the present. Which are 
the ethical grounds to sustain it?  
 
We can assume that people prefer to tradeoff possible harms today with possible harms 
tomorrow. But, what about those that had not been borne? The discount of benefits, non-
monetary benefits, becomes inappropriate since they are not here to choose, and thus 
there makes no difference since a year-live saved is not another thing than a year-life 
saved60. This is a simple not only in the value of future lives but in future lives 
themselves. The government is taking a decision to trade lives today for future lives,  
discounting future peoples preferences.  
 
The ethical question is stronger than the statement of the OMB, who says to agencies, if 
your rule will have important intergenerational benefits or costs you might consider a 
further sensitivity analysis using a lower but positive discount rate in addition to 
calculating net benefits using discount rates of 3 and 7 percent61. There is no need in 
                                                
60 Revesz, Supra, note 58. And Sunstein, Supra, note 19, at1714. 
61 OMB, Supra, note 52, at 36. 
explaining that such margins as 3% to 7% could create huge differences in the final 
outcome of the cost-benefit relation, and therefore, huge differences in the tradeoff of 
lives today for future lives.   
 
After discussing for more than ten pages the problems of benefits in cost-benefit analysis, 
Sunstein suggests that Courts should respect the agencies decision if it is based on 
reasonable grounds. It is evident that discounting at any rate can be reasonably stated 
the simple logic of discount rates is enough. The problem is deeper than judicial revision; 
there must be statutory regulation that defines strict criteria to agencies and stop the 
moral hazard that could be involved in the definition of the discount rate.   
 
 
3.2 Culture and the Value of a Statistical Life: Cross-country analysis 
 
Viscusi maintains that, a variety of factors could account for the disparities in values of 
statistical lives in different countries. One of those factors is income, which seems to 
have a clear relationship with the value of a statistical life. According to Viscusi, the 
cause of a lower valuation in developing countries is that they are poorer which implies 
that SVL has a linear relation with income- and safety, then, is a normal good62. 
However, Viscusi also suggests that cultural influences in preferences and labor market 
institutions could affect the value of a statistical life across countries. Unfortunately, to 
simplify his analysis goes over such statements and focus his findings in the problem of 
                                                
62 W. Kip Viscusi. Wealth Effects and Earnings Premiums for Job Hazards. 60 (3) Rev. Econ. and 
Statistics 408, (1978). 
income and valuation. Two problems arise form such statement: first, to assume that 
culture and labor market institution do not have significant incidence in the determination 
of the value of a statistical life is to avoid the problem of culture and cognition63. And 
second, avoid the question about culture is a overestimates the incidence of income in the 
tradeoff between risks and prices/wages or risks.  
 
As we can see the calculation of VSL takes into account the effect of income, education, 
productivity ,gender, etc. However, the literature has avoided to study the effect of 
culture and values in the preference for risks and therefore in the VSL. The question is, 
then, as culture and values affect the preferences for risks, do these preferences have a 
significant incidence in valuation of statistical lives?  
 
a. Culture and values  
 
A priori or intuitively I can assure, that the aforementioned variables do not exhaust the 
causality relationship that permit to explain the different values of a statistical life. This is 
observed in the number countries with similar economic and institutional structures 
(labor markets) that, according to the mainstream model, could lead to think that the 
statistical value of life would be approximated, yet, there are countries with such 
similarities but high differential gaps in their rates as we just saw. 
 
                                                
63 Cfr. Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama. Culture and the Self." Implications for Cognition, 
Emotion, and Motivation. 98 Psychological Review, (1991). Paul DiMaggio. Culture and Cognition. 23 
Annual Review of Sociology. 263 (August 1997). 
Can the culture affect the economic behavior of agents? Despite that anthropologists and 
sociologists categorically affirm, when facing such question, that culture has a strong 
incidence in the system of preferences and the decisional behavior of agents. Economists 
as Francois and Zabojnik64 are still skeptical and set aside the cultural differences and 
focus their explanations in the unquestionable rational maximizations process65. 
 
As it is explained by Hofstede66, it is possible to make a measure of certain values 
immersed in cultures, which define the pattern of behavior of agents and which can be 
correlated with the VSL determined.  Hofstede defined four cultural dimensions 
comparable among countries that contribute to determine the values system that, 
according to our intuition, could have an effect on the VSL. These dimensions are 
numerically/qualitatively represented with the following indexes: Power Distance Index 
(PDI); referring to the extent a society included and accept the unequal distribution of 
power67; b) Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), referred as the degree in which certain 
culture programs its members to feel comfortable before an unforeseen or unforeseeable 
situations68; c) Individualism-Collectivism Index (ICI), as the degree the society 
reinforces individual or collective achievement and interpersonal relationships and; d) 
Masculinity-Feminity Index (MFI),  the degree the society reinforces, or does not 
                                                
64 Francois, Patrick y Zabojnik, Jan (2001). Culture and development: an analytical framework, CentER, 
Department of Economics, Tilburg University, The Netherlands. 
65 The problem is not the rational maximization process; the problem is the exclusion of culture as a part of 
the tastes of agents. In Fairness vs. Welfare Kaplow and Shavell define moral/values tastes as a part of the 
utility function and therefore a part of social welfare utility function.  
66 Geert Hofstede. Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. (1997)  
67 Geert Hofstede. Cultures Consequences, 146 (2001). 
68 Id. 
reinforce, the traditional masculine work role model of male achievement, control, and 
power69.  
 
Then, the expected relation ships between the independent variable and the dependent 
variable are: Income will have a positive relation, then the more income, the higher the 
VSL. PDI will have a negative relation since the higher the distance with power and the 
acceptance of inequalities the higher the preferences for valuation of life. ICI will have a 
positive relationship, since the more individualistic is a society the more the valuation of 
the self and the lower the risk tradeoffs. And finally, the higher the UAI, the lower the 
tolerance for uncertainty the lower the preferences for risks, and therefore the higher the 
valuation of lives.  
 
 
 
b. Data analysis 
 
Using data from several sources70, I use the Value of a Statistical Life estimated in 16 
different countries. I also used Hofstedes indexes to test differences in cultures. I used 
                                                
69 Id. 
70 Viscusi, Supra, note 6; W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life. Discussion Paper 517, Olin Center for Law 
and Economics. (Jun, 2005); David OCONNOR, ANCILLARY BENEFITS ESTIMATION IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT; Mariana Conte Grand, et. al. 
Estimacion del Costo Economico en Argentina de la Mortalidad Atribuible al Tabaco en Adultos. XXXVIII 
these indexes due to its likely to make cross-country evaluations, and because permits a 
simplified access to cultural differences. I also used a variable for test the effect of 
income, measured in GDP per capita and evaluated in Purchase Power Parity (ppp).  The 
data is presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Variables.  
 
 
 
The correlation matrix (Table 3) shows that UAI has a low correlation with the VSL. 
Also shows that Viscusi is right in assuming a relation between income and VSL. The 
other cultural indexes have the expected relation, and MAS has the strongest correlation 
with VSL.  
                                                                                                                                            
Jornadas de Economia Politica. (2003); Pablo Hojman, Estimación del valor de las reducciones de riesgo en 
accidentes vitales. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.  
 
 
 Table 3. Correlation Matrix 1.  
 
Ran with: Excel, 2003. 
 
 
To determine the effect of culture, I tested a cross section econometric model, where the 
objective function was a linear. The objective of this test was to define if there is a 
functional relation between VSL, cultural values represented by the indexes and income. 
The functional form is  
 
 
 
The first model tested included all the cultural variables and income. The results, 
included in Table 4 indicate that UAI, PDI and IDV are not significant at 95%. 
Additional regressions ran, showed that those variables where not even significant at a 
90%. Then, to determine a possible model, conducted a elimination process, to determine 
a model based in the partial r2.  
 
Table 4. Anova  Model 1.  
iKiiiii uxxxy +++++= ββββ L33221
  
According to this, of the possible models, the most likely to represent a functional 
relation between culture, income and VSL, was the one that included income and MAS as 
variables (See Table 5). Indicating that income is still one of the most important elements 
in the definition of VSL, and that culture, represented by the prevalence of masculine 
behavior and male power, at least in this first test seems unlikely because it goes againt 
our a priori model. Then, even thought there is a significant relation between the cultural 
variable and the VSL this relation is not definite and goes against the logic of the model.  
 
Table 5. Anova  Model 2.  
 
 
 
 The relations and results have several limitations and therefore call for further study 
which I will do. These limitations are:  
 
- The Sample is small. Only 16 countries. The problem is that usually the VSL in 
every country is not published in English, then the research of such data is 
costly.  
 
- The VSL values tested do not correspond with the same risk. This makes a 
disparity in the comparison of WTP and Risk preferences. In addition, the 
methodologies to determine the VSL were not compared. 
 
- The cultural values indexes had been criticized due to their assumptions about 
masculine and feminine behavior, the collectivist and individualist character of 
countries and the power relationships. Probably using different data the 
conclusions will be significant.  
 
- The resultant model reflects Viscusis assumptions but dont include the 
variable that I found more closely related with risk preferences (UAI) and 
includes a questionable variable as MAS.  
 
4. Conclusions  
 
Mainstream economists accept that cost-benefit analysis is not always definitive. But, the 
question is, is there anything better than CBA? Sunsteins propositions recalls this 
limitation but also the benefits, since CBA it is the best mean to defend and overcome 
problems related with individual and social cognition, it also provides with a framework 
analysis, that lead CBA to be understood as a method for putting on screen important 
social facts that might otherwise escape private and public attention71 leading to develop 
not the most efficient regulation72 but at least the most desirable one. 
 
On the other hand, several issues face the cost benefit analysis theory related with the 
valuation of a statistical life. First, as I highlighted, discount rates should be properly 
studied in the calculation of benefits derived from statistical lives. As was said, the 
discount rate gives to the regulator a great margin of discretionality and therefore gives 
the regulator a power that will be a part of political markets and could lead to regulatory 
takings.  
 
Second, it is necessary to study risks and its relation with culture and values. In the 
econometric analysis I tested the null hypothesis that said that culture had a relationship 
with the VSL. Unfortunately, the hypothesis could not be sustained since the only 
statistically significant value was masculinity, which did not seem to have a logical 
relationship with risk preferences. These results could come from one of three problems: 
first, that culture has no relation with risk preferences, second, that there is no relation 
between risk preferences and wiliness to pay for life; or third, that the data set used to test 
                                                
71 Id. at 1060-63. 
72 Id.  
the hypothesis is not accurate to evidence the relationship between culture and risk 
preferences. The literature cited has stressed the relation between culture, cognition and 
risks preferences73 and has proved its close relations. On the other hand, the hedonic 
wages models have shown to be effective in determining the willingness to accept risks, 
and therefore the VSL. Then I suggest that the problem is in the data set, therefore more 
research and further study is necessary. 
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